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The following two papers (printed as 
Part 1 and 2) were prepared for delivery 
at the University of Witwatersrand, 
Johannesburg, South Africa, April/ May 
1983. 
1. The urban transition: According to
Kingsley Davis, the demographer, the
world is passing through what he calls
the urban transition. This is a movement,
begun about two centuries ago, and
expected to be completed by the middle
of the next century, in which the popu­
lation of the world shifts from 90 percent
rural to 90 percent urban residence and
occupation (current urbanization levels,
measured by population residing in
urban places with more than 20 OOO
inhabitants, are more than 52 percent in
the developed nations and 22 percent in
the developing countries of the world,
for a grand world total of 30 percent).
The shape of this transition can be
modelled in the form of an S-curve, with
a slow and gradual beginning, a period
of rapid urban expansion, and a gradual
slowing down, as the asymptote value is
being reached. During the rapid phase
of the transition, urban rates of increase
may amount to a doubling or more of
population every ten years. The actual
distribution among cities, of course, will
vary from less than the average increase
in total population to three times and
more the average national rate at the
principal growth points of the economy.
It is obvious that these rates cannot
continue indefinitely, though they can
run very high for several decades (e.g., at
twice the average increase in the popu­
lation), reinforced, as they are, by
migration from the countryside and from
abroad.
There is a statistical illusion about the 
phase of "rapid urbanization" about 
which we need to be cognizant: however 
rapid it may appear, the urbanization is 
still insufficient in most parts of the 
world to reduce the absolute numbers of 
rural people. It follows that even where 
the rate of urban increase is above 5 
percent a year, rural densities may con­
tinue to increase. By the same token, the 
rate at which total population is urban­
izing is very much less than the rate of 
urban increase or city growth: actual 
urbanization rates in Third World coun­
tries are not much higher - indeed they 
may be less - than the corresponding 
rates in European countries during their 
period of rapid urbanization in the 19th 
century. 
In any event, urbanization has become a 
dominant fact of our time and because 
of its global research, one of the most 
dramatic and profound phenomena in 
the history of the world. 
What should be the governments' 
response to the phenomenon of rapid 
urbanization? 
But to put the question in this way is 
MISLEADING: it is misleading in two 
senses: first, because it suggests that urban­
ization is a "spontaneous" or natural 
phenomenon which must be confronted 
by public policy .. . when in actual fact, 
it is 'a socially produced phenomenon; 
and a second, because it suggests that 
urbanization is a uniform phenomenon 
-equivalent to the spatial concentration
of people in so-called urban settlements
(usually identified by size and density),
and their presumptive shift from primary
pursuits in agriculture to a wage form of
employment in non-agricultural activ�­
ties, collectively referred to as industry
and services, when in actual fact, it is a
series of multi-dimensional, linked phe­
nomenon that give rise to a very com­
plex, differentiated reality.
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First, I want briefly to address these two 
reinterpretations of urbanization. I will 
then proceed to make some comments 
on policy in which I will talk on the 
following issues: 
(a) the question of development object­
ives;
(b) policies for the sector of "petty
comrr1:odity production";
( c) the role of the household economy
in urbanization.
2. Rapid urbanization is a socially pro­
duced phenomenon: while the urban
transition as a whole may be regarded as
an historical phenomenon that for all
practical purposes may be treated as a
given, the shape of the curve, and there­
fore the rates of urbanization - or the
spreading out of urbanization over a
number of decades - is best regarded a
result of public policies that encourage
one type of growth over another. Col­
lectively, these policies have be_en called,
by Michael Lipton, urban bias.
• there is the urban bias that manifests
itself in rural underdevelopment: the
starvation of rural areas in the allo­
cation of investments, incorrect poli­
cies with regard to food importation
and pricing, the concentration of
investments in rural areas in large­
scale, capital-intensive work, and the
marginalization of small farmers who
are forced either to subdivide their
already over-cultivated lands still
further among an increasing popula­
tion, or to hire themselves out as
labour to corporate and large-scale
commercial farmers, or to move
towards a land frontier that offers
few possibilities for producing a sur­
plus above subsistence, or to move to
the city.
• there is the urban bias that manifests
itself in the spatial concentration of
political power in the principal core
region of a country, leading to the
phenomenon that geographers have
labelled "urban primacy" and to a
generally favourable environment for
further core region investment on
both public and private account.
There are a number of developing
countries in which power is more
equitably shared among the states of 
a federation than it is in unitary states
(Nigeria, India), but most everywhere
there is only a national centre of
power and very limited administrative
discretion in provinces. Cities almost
everywhere are deprived of meaning­
ful self-government; like rural areas,
they are starved of resources, unless
they happen to be located in the core
or, better yet, unless they are the
national capital which is the primary
beneficiary of government largesse.
• urban bias manifests itself in the
spatial transfer of income (surplus
over subsistence) to the national
centre. Income is transferred through
a variety of mechanisms that are a
direct and intended outgrowth of
policy: discriminatory price policy,
with farmers receiving less than the
going world price for their marketable
commodities; taxation; surplus trans­
fers by landlords; and establishment
of rural banks which tap rural savings
and channel them to national core
areas.
• urban bias manifests itself in an indus­
trialization policy that emphasizes
large-scale investments in capita/­
intensive industry (import substitu­
tion) with a small number of plants
capable of meeting the limited nation­
al demand, most of which is in any
event concentrated in the core region,
so that production comes to be con­
centrated there as well. (Recent efforts
to introduce an export sector through
EPZs has led to the choice of some
provincial locations, but the devel­
opment potential of this kind of indus­
trialization is even more limited than
the first kind).
We may conclude briefly; if these policies 
were reversed, if rural development were 
to be given priority in investment pro­
gramming, and if the mass of small farm­
ers were to be the object of new policies; 
if political power were more equitably 
shared among the regions and cities of 
the country; if surpluses for investment 
were allowed to accumulate regionally 
instead of being transferred to national 
core areas; if industrialization policies 
were to stress a "walking on two legs" 
approach with rural industrialization 
being viewed as a serious alternative to 
capital-intensive industrialization in the 
major cities ... if all these things were 
done, the possibilities for reducing the 
rate of urbanization (and changing· the 
entire urbanization profile) ·would be 
greatly enhanced. 
3. Urbanization is a multi-dimensional
phenomenon: so far, we have looked at
urbanization as though it only involved
the spatial concentration of the popula­
tion and their taking up new occupations
generally considered "urban" because of
their locational status: industry and ser­
vices. While this will do as a first appro­
ximation, it is an overly simple concep­
tion quite useless for policy making.
We need to study urbanization along 
five dimensions: spatial, economic, 
social, political, and environmental. 
Most urban problems can be properly 
understood and realistically confronted 
only in a multi-dimensional and time­
dependent view, where each dimension 
is also a dimension of change. Admit­
tedly, it is a difficult view to acqieve. 
Each dimension is the subject area of a 
separate social science discipline, and the 
overlay of disciplines in the study of even 
single problem area, such as settlement 
policy, housing, or the changing role of 
the family, is rarely achieved. 
All the same, it must be tried, even if we 
must sacrifice the simple and straight­
forward meaning of urbanization that is 
based on sheer demographic spatial con­
centration and in which so many plan­
ning studies delight. We can no longer 
afford to compartmentalize our studies 
of cities and to deal with, say, migration 
flows over here, on the right, urban 
systems analysis on the left, production 
and employment on the first floor, urban 
class formation and social movements in 
the basement, relations of power and the 
structure of the local state in the attic, 
and energy, water, and residuals man­
agement out in the street. These similar 
aspects of urbanization must be brought 
into explicit relation to each other, that 
we might learn not only why things work 
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as they do, and how this might change in 
the future, but also tackle quite practical 
problems that arise from the urbaniza­
tion process itself or from the underlying 
forces that influence specific historical 
patterns. 
There are, of course, different levels of 
explanation, ranging from the imme­
diately functional to deeper structural 
levels. But at some level surely we shall 
need a theoretically adequate,. encom­
passing framework which helps us to 
order urban phenomena and to see them 
as something other than a disconnected 
jumble of observations. 
To talk of this now would take us too 
far afield. I would simply like to point 
out that the structuralist, political­
economy approach, so popular today, 
proposes just such a framework. What­
ever you might think about it, and there 
is certainly room for argument, the poli­
tical economy approach, properly modi­
fied to include also a spatial dimension, 
represents a vast improvement over the 
fragmented splinter theories of tradi­
tional social science, together with their 
relatively simplistic planning applica­
tions. 
4. The Question of Development Object­
ives: Specific policies are formulated in
the context of general framework of
objectives. In Third World countries,
these objectives (in the first instance)
have to do with "development". But
development of what and of whom? How
shall we think of this elusive term?
Historically, the meaning of developme,1t
has gone through several transforma­
tions. In the late 40s and throughout the
50s, development was, by and large,
thought to be identical with the rapid
growth of the economy. This was to be
brought about by raising the levels of
investment from 4 or 5% to lO or 15%,
and by accelerating the process of urban­
based industrialization. When this model
"failed" in the sense of producing appall­
ing social and spatial inequities and an
absolute increase in the population living
under conditions of poverty, the inter­
national community of development pro­
fessionals argued for a shift in objectives.
Henceforth, development would be expli­
citly defined as "growth with distribu­
tion" and the emphasis was to be placed
on policies that would promote full
employment and a more equal distri­
bution of incomes. Poverty populations
were identified as potential "target 
groups", and renewed interest sprang up 
in agriculture and comprehensive rural 
development. These· were the 60s and 
early 70s, the years that also saw the 
appearance, the hopes and dis­
appointments, of the so-called green 
revolution with its package of hybrid 
seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and irri­
gation. Then, in the mid-70s, a new 
concept was introduced and much dis­
cussed: the concept of Basic Needs. No 
one quite knew what Basic Needs were, 
or how the approach to development 
would have to change to satisfy so called 
Basic Needs. But on the whole, there 
was agreement that a BN-approach 
would mean the elimination of mass 
poverty as a high priority objective, as 
perhaps THE objective of development. 
BN-approaches went harid-in-hand with 
a strategy of self-reliance (that, among 
other things, was intended to include 
self-sufficiency in staple foods) and what 
some called "selective closure", that is, a 
modification of free trade doctrine and 
the international division of labour based 
on it. N at_ional, regional, and local 
interests were being valorized. Devel� 
opment was becoming territorially 
defined! 
But, of course, these changing definitions 
did not always trace actual practice. 
Development experts might be talking 
about BN-strategies, but international 
capital was going global and was shifting 
labour-intensive manufacturing to export 
production zones (EPZs) in Asia, Africa, 
and parts of Latin America. And the 
global economy was strictly free-trade. 
Competition would lower the price of 
labour to a world price. Among other 
things, this meant a lowering of the wage 
among i.ndustrial workers in the core 
countries of the capitalist economy. The 
present world crisis is, to a large extent, 
a result of this restructuring of capital. 
As the welfare state in western core 
economies is being dismantled, problems 
which we thought had been solved over 
a generation ago, are beginriing to re­
appear. 
Actual development objectives are at an 
impasse now as countries are trying 
merely to stay afloat, though BN­
strategies seem increasingly attractive to 
many, and the environmental movement 
is trying to link into the new stategy with 
its concept of eco-development. At the 
very moment of its greatest triumph, the 
creation of a truly global economy in 
terms of production as well as markets, 
capitalism is being challenged by these 
new concepts of Basic Needs, eco­
development, self-reliance, and d�vel­
opment from below, which spell o.ut a 
counter-revolution of development. 
With regard to urbanization, three 
macro-policies have been contending for 
attention. They all had to do with the 
urban transition. The first macro-policy 
wanted to reverse the urban transition 
through a concerted policy of ruraliza­
tion or de-urbanization. Only Kampu­
chea (under the brutal regime of Pol 
Pot) and South Africa have tried to swim 
against the "stream of history". The 
method in both countries was coercive. 
Kampuchea's horrible fate, the death of 
millions of its citizens, has entered the 
annals of history as one of the most 
misguided, shameful episodes in human 
memory, and the policy has been 
reversed. In South Africa, the forcible 
return of the majority black population 
to so-called homelands on 14 percent of 
the national terrain is a story that is too 
well known here to require comment. 
The second macro-policy looked towards 
a balanced rural-urban development, in 
which the rate of urbanization would be 
kept low. Here, the urban transition 
would not be challenged, but the period 
of time over which it would occur was to 
be stretched out. This policy involved 
measures favourable to rural develop­
ment, including the retention of a large 
part of the rural surplus for reinvestment 
(along with land reform, rural indus­
trialization, etc.). A number of socialist 
countries tried this policy with consider­
able success - among them Cuba and 
Maoist China - and, if I am not mis­
taken, also India would qualify as a 
success. 
Finally, the most widespread model was 
that of accelerated urbanization. It is the 
model applied in virtually all African 
countries that are loosely called "capi­
talist", such as N�geria and the Ivory 
Coast. Accelerated urbanization policies 
were often complemented by futile 
attempts to spread development into the 
national periphery through so-called 
growth centre policies. Rural develop­
ment, on the other hand, was neglected. 
These macro-urbanization policy options 
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are not independent of the overall 
development policy frameworks. De­
urbanization ( or ruralization) represents 
a special case: it is the policy of a state at 
war with its own people. Balanced rural/ 
urban development is highly consistent 
with Basic Needs strategies, and the 
policy of accelerated urbanization (with 
or without its complement of growth 
poles) goes along with economic growth 
through industrialization as the leading 
objective. Development in the sense of 
an improvement in the basic well-being 
of the population at large is here seen to 
come about as a result of sustained rapid 
growth (the Rostowian "take-off') that 
will eventually lead to a society of mass 
consumption. Of course, the chances of 
this happening in any other countries 
but a handful of special cases, such as 
Taiwan and Singapore, or the OPEC 
countries, is extremely remote. In the 
meantime, this model generates extra­
ordinary social costs in terms of social 
inequality, environmental destruction, 
human suffering, and exploitation. 
5. The petty commodity sector: Con­
trary to some people's thinking, work is
still what it takes for most of us tp make
a living. If you don't work, you don't
live. Although we haven't broken Adam's
curse, we have created an economy in
which there isn't enough paid productive
work to go around for everyone.
This is nowhere more true than in Third 
World economies where most urban 
workers cannot find a job in the capital­
ized industrial sector and the high-level 
services connected with it. The typical 
ratio is IO: I, for every ten percent gain in 
industrial output, there is a one percent 
gain in employment. At this rate, the 
ratio of manufacturing to total employ­
ment is creeping up very, very slowly, 
and in none of the newly industrializing 
countries exceeds 25 percent. Overall, 
on a global basis, the ratio of manufac­
turing to total employment is actually 
declining: we are slowly moving into the 
post-industrial era. 
Since people still have to live, however, 
they create their own work. And this, 
basically, is what statisticians have 
defined as the "informal" sector that is 
so visible in many Third World cities 
and elsewhere. There are many notions 
about this sector, whose very hetero­
geneity makes it difficult to pin down. 
Entry conditions into the informal sector 
are said to b'e low: there are few capital 
requirements; even literacy is not essen­
tial. Because much of this sector is work 
that escapes the licensing and taxing 
authority of the state, it is sometimes 
referred to as the unenumerated sector. 
Still others, impressed by their low over­
head, call it the street economy, which at 
least has an attractive sound to it, though 
many informal workers in fact have 
rented premises and the street has invisi­
ble locational (territorial) boundaries. 
Census takers who need a simple crite­
rion by which to distinguish this sector, 
ofte,n use size of firm as a criterion. And 
so, many accounts of the informal sector 
describe it as those enterprises that have 
ten or fewer workers; the majority are in 
business for themselves. 
Structuralists, whose interpretation, of 
urbanization relates it to the dominant 
mode of production (i.e., capitalism), 
prefer another concept to describe some­
what the same reality: they speak of petty
commodity production, where com­
modity refers to any goods or service 
that is produced for sale. This designa­
tion has the advantage of allowing 
"informal" work to be treated within the 
same theoretical construct. Petty corn:: 
modity production is a subordinate sec­
tor of large-:scale capitalist production 
and is functionally related to that sector. 
The designation also ,makes it clear that 
petty commodity production is, indeed, 
productive in the sense of adding to the 
gross. domestic ptod�ct. The man who 
watches your car at the parking lot, the 
shoe shine boy, the barber who cuts your 
hair ... they are all producing a service 
we need. The food stall vendors, most of 
whom are women, feed a large part of 
the working population during the day, 
at a fraction of the cost of what a restau­
rant meal would be. There are ubiquitous 
plumbers, carpenters, tailc,rs, electricians, 
mechanics, radio repairmen whose job is 
to repair and to build. There are sweat 
shops that bum the midnight oil to make 
parts of shoes and clothing that are 
assembled somewhere else and sold in 
the elegant stores of the city to members 
of the upper class. Porters carry loads 
from one part of town to another at top 
speed: running, bicycling, motor scoot­
ing, or push carting. They, too, perform 
necessary, productive work. On the side 
walks are the'hawkers selling plastic toys, 
soap, cigarettes, lottery tickets, news­
papers, cheap perfume. They make their 
living by providing a convenience. At 
night; women hawk their bodies to men 
willing to pay for them: it is an ancient 
profession. 
All this mass of working people - the 
labouring poor as they used to be called 
- are productive and they are free. They
are not controlled by the state, and that
is why they are often perceived to be a
problem, when in_ fact they are the solu­
tion. For many of these workers, their
particular form of self-employment (or
employment as apprentice workers in a
small shop) is a step up the ladder to a
secure position in the world, a foothold
on the slippery slopes of city life. The
more successful ones may eventually gain
entry into the coveted "formal" sector
where, in return for license and an annual
tax bill, they go legal and can begin a
slow process of capitalist accumulation:
they gain the privilege of joining the
exploiting classes.
Petty commodity producers are a threat 
to no one: they are people busy trying to 
survive by their own sheer wits and 
effort. They cater to a demand. Their 
efforts should be supported. Instead, they 
are harrassed by the police, the bureau­
cracy worked overtime to control their 
presence in the world, mostly by saying 
NO, declaring this and that to be OFF­
LIMITS. It is a common sight in many 
Third World cities to see police chase a 
hapless street vendor through congested 
traffic: the man had no license to live. 
Elsewhere, low-income housing areas are 
broken up, the little heaps of accumu­
lated capital in the form of shacks and 
shops burned, levelled to the ground, the 
people herded like cattle onto trucks and 
dumped somewhere out in the country­
side. Within a matter of days, of course, 
these very same people will drift back 
into the city .. . minus their accumulated 
possessions, to start again from ground 
zero. They have nowhere else to go. 
If these things did not happen . . . and 
they are happening every day in. some 
Third World city, the,' are happening in 
South Africa, as you know . . . there 
would be no need to dwell on them. The 
working poor are not defying the state, 
they arp not lawless just because they are 
officiruly outside the law. It is their way 
of surviving in brutally competitive 
world. They are in the street, because 
'-
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they can't pay the rent; they are not 
licensed because they can't pay the fee 
and their employment is not steady. They 
work in the interstices of an urban struc­
ture that would collapse without them. 
What should the policy be with respect 
to the petty commodity sector? It is a 
subtle, delicate matter, because so much 
of that sector is what Terry McGee has 
called involuted. Involution means that, 
under conditions of limited growth in 
demand, the same work 1s broken down 
into ever smaller tasks and specializa­
tions, each of which provides a little 
livelihood for the owner of that work. If 
there were jobs for everyone at a level of 
decent income, this same work could be 
organized more efficiently, with fewer 
workers. But there isn't enough work to 
go around, and so there is involution. 
Anything that the state might do, there­
fore, to make the petty commodity sector 
more efficient might eliminate someone's 
job and livelihood. 
The best thing the state can do under the 
circumstances is laissez-faire, to lay off 
the daily harrassment, to leave· people 
the fruit of their labours, to leave them 
the housing they built, to let them con­
duct the businesses that are so clearly 
needed, and to allow them to develop 
their own self-help organizations. It is at 
the point where self-help organizations 
begin to appear and only then, that the 
state can begin to play a positive, facili­
tating role, providing credit, training, 
physical facilities; and the like. 
6. The Household Economy: In con­
clusion, I should like to talk about the
household economy. The petty com­
modity sector is ·integrated with the
marketeconomy, but we must remember
that a lot of work, absolutely essential
work, gets done outside the market, and
is directly for use, though it may involve
reciprocal exchange and co-operative
endeavour. It is the ubiquitous work of
the household.
Ostensibly, the household works for 
itself, for the maintenance of life. As 
such, it is the smallest unit of society. 
Without a social base, households cannot 
subsist. One person households are artifi­
cially maintained by the state or must 
purchase their livelihood in the market 
place. At the same time, household pro­
duction is directly related to and func­
tional for capitalist accumulation. It 
guarantees the reproduction of labour in 
the market at no cost to capital itself. 
Particularly in the case of poor house­
holds, it is the ingenuity of the women 
who for the most part are responsible 
for their management, that their men 
folk are prepared to accept less than 
subsistence wages at their place of work. 
Life is produced below cost. (That is 
why poor people, women in particular, 
age prematurely. It is they who absorb 
the cost, and make possible the super­
profits of the capitalist sector). 
Household economies are also the major
market/or commodities produced in the 
capitalist sector. Because the household 
economy requires an infrastructure (shel­
ter, furniture, cooking equipment, etc.) 
as well as a steady flow of raw materials 
(fuel, uncooked edibles, soap). 
There are three statements I should like 
to make about the household economy 
and its role in urbanization and devel­
opment. 
First, the household economy, particu­
larly among low income families, 
depends for its well-being on social
networks. These are networks among 
family members, fictive kin, and neigh­
bours. From these social networks evolve 
organized, co-operative efforts: self-help 
housing construction, minding each 
other's children, organized sewing circles, 
the celebration of festivals, credit asso­
ciations, and the like. A good commu­
nity, people will say, is one that is 
friendly, sociable where life is spon­
taneously organized, where people are 
helpful. 
Second, the household economy requires 
a secure physical domain to do its work. 
It requires adequate space for its many 
activities: the preparing of meals, the 
raising of small children, sewing and 
patching of clothing, the caring for the 
old and the sick. These are activities that 
· in the capitalist economy appear in the
form of restaurants, creches, tailor shops,
health clinics, and nursing homes. In the
capitalist economy, their right to exist­
ence in the urban fabric, to a territorial
domain, to permanency of occupance is
recognized in the law. The household
economy in poor districts is often not so
blessed .. It lives in permanent fear of
dispossession in the dark shadows of
illegality. Without security, social net­
works cannot form, people become hos-
tile and suspicious of each other. They 
live next to strangers. The very sinews of 
the lives ate torn apart. 
Third, the household economy needs to 
become more efficient in its budgeting of
time. Again, this refers primarily to those 
households where physical survival. is a 
full-time occupation. Who has not seen 
small children trek for 45 minutes up 
some improbable slope with a five-gallon 
canister of water precariously perched 
on top of their head? Survival among 
the poor takes an inordinate amount/of 
time. Cooking equipment is the most 
primitive, fuel is expensive and hard to 
get, shopping for essential items must be 
done in distant places because ordinances 
forbid the establishment of convenience 
shopping in tqe neighbourhood, on rainy 
days, it is virtually impossible to venture 
outside into a sea of mud and slimy 
effluent, a visit to a health clinic for the 
poor may take up an entire day in travel 
time and waiting. It is as if poor com­
munities were designed for inefficiency, 
deprived as they are of even the most 
essential services. And such services as 
are provided through the so-called 
private sector (e.g., informal water distri­
bution through vending, taxicabs, illegal 
food boutiques in the neighbourhood) 
the cost is exorbitant relative to house­
hold income: water costs may gobble up 
15 or more percent of earnings, neigh­
bourhood stores have big mark-ups over 
supermarkets, taxi cabs charge what the 
traffic will bear. And so, there is always 
an agonizing trade-off between time and 
money, and in the end, it may be that 
the very survival of household members 
is put on the scale. To pay for transport­
ation to work in the,'exchange economy, 
you may have no choice but to starve 
yourself or your children or both. It is a 
desperate choice. 
Household work is not valorized by 
society. It is invisible work, and women 
and children are the invisible workers. 
Development policy deals with the 
exchange economy, it is chiefly con­
cerned with the interests of capital. It is 
scarcely concerned at all with life and 
the production of life. 
But policies can be changed. And here 
and there we have gained experience, 
and we know, more or less, what needs 
to.be done. 
The importance of the household, ahd 
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of household workers, for society must 
be recognized. That is the starting point 
for any policy. 
A permanent physical domain for the 
household economy must be secured. 
This involves a number of specifics. First,
the security of tenure to land whether in· 
outright ownership or 'in leasehold. The 
optimum solution would be communally­
held land that is let out to individual 
households under specified conditions, 
and that cannot be alienated. Second,
residential communities should be placed 
close in to potential work places (I recall 
here the idealized garden cities of 
Ebenezer Howard and his followers 
where work-residence combinations were 
the very essence of the idea: difficult to 
realize in practice in all of its particulars, 
the principle is nevertheless an important 
one. Both travel time and cost of travel 
should be minimized). Third, basic util­
ities must be provided: water, electricity, 
sewage and waste disposal, good drain­
age, paved streets. In addition, there are 
essential services that must be brought 
into the neighbourhoods: schools, child 
care centres, health clinics, community 
centres·, shopping facilities, post offices, 
public telephones, recreation areas, and 
adequate bus services are among the 
most important. Fourth, provision 
should be made for the raising of agri­
cultural produce within the urban area, 
in the form of communal or allotment 
gardens. This practice would have a sub­
stantial and favourable impact on house­
hold incomes and nutrition, and is nota­
bly increasing in many Third World 
cities. 
All this together would lead to a flore­
scence of self-help and co-operation. It 
would create an adequate, healthy envi-
' ronment for raising children, it would 
enable households to plan for their own 
improvement and to advance beyond 
survival to a decent and meaningful 
existence. 
All of this costs money, yoti will say, and 
who will pay for it? 
My answer is simple and straightfor­
ward: in the end, it is people.'s labour 
that will pay for it. Urban migrants, poor 
people, are not parasites. In many parts 
of the world, they are treated as raw 
material to be used up in the production 
process that enables the rest of us to live 
as we do. They are squeezed in the work 
place, they are squeezed in the street, 
and they are squeezed at home. Then, if 
they are still alive, they are discarded. 
We have no more use for them. 
All that I have tried to say. is that this 
treatment is no longer acceptable. It 
reflects what the powerful regard as their 
unlimited right to oppress those who are 
weaker than they. It is devoid of any 
moral basis whatsoever. 
It is the labour of the poor that sustains 
the rich man's econ�my . That is why the 
poor are poor. What needs to happen 
now is that they themselves are sustained. 
And this requires a commitment to the 
empowerment of the poor. 
PART II: THE ROLE OF CAPITALISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THIRD WORLD 
COUNTRIES 
Change, any sort of change, is hard to 
cope with. So we find devices to soothe 
the mind, to mak'e the transition to what 
is new a little easier. One such device is 
to invest old words with new meanings. 
In this way, we can pretend that the 
familiar things to which we are used still 
surround us, are still part of our lives, 
and that the new is basically the same as 
the old, only a little different. Until one 
morning we wake up to a world that is 
transformed. 
Two such words that serve us well in this 
role are capitalism and development. 
Good old capitalism, always decked out 
in new clothing: mercantile, industrial, 
monopoly, post-industrial . .. these 
words suggest phases in a single mode of 
production, as marxists call it, they are 
ways of designating salient facts, a way 
of life: wage labour, markets, profit­
.seeking, individualism, and private accu­
mulation. (But there are statist forms of 
capitalism, too, and this leads to con­
ceptual problems. Some of the basic charac­
teristics of the mode of production may 
have to be revised.) 
Or development: it's been around for at 
least a generation, replacing older terms 
such as "progress" or "industrialization". 
But ask anyone - and there are now 
specialists in development, so we can 
consult the experts - to what range of 
phenomena "development" applies and 
we'll receive a lot of different answers. 
Who or what is to be developed? 
Nations? Individuals? Households? the 
Economy? Social classes? regions? And 
how do we know that "development" 
has actually occurred? By .the claims 
people make? by their good intentions? 
by statistical measures, such as the gross 
domestic product or various social indi­
cators? And what values must those indi­
cators have in order to be called a "satis­
factory" development? Are questions of 
distribution important, and if so, in what 
sense? Is development also a political 
phenomenon? Must it be sustained to be 
development? Is it a spontaneous process 
or is it planned? Are planning and devel­
opment essentially the same? 
Not only is there uncertainty in the 
answers we shall receive to our inquiry, 
but the range of answers (and the degree 
of certainty that attaches to them) will 
vary a good deal, depending on whether 
we direct our questions to economists, 
sociologists, businessmen, or politicians; 
to those who grew up in the 50s, 60s and 
the 70s; to people with international organ­
izations or to national leaders. But 
because there is a single handy word 
indifferently used, we think there must 
be a corresponding reality. And so we 
hold on to the notion of development 
and invest it with our dreams and hopes. 
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I mention this, because at this very 
moment we are in the midst of a transi­
tion from one kind of world to another, 
in which the meanings of old words will 
undergo dramatic change. By holding 
on to the hollow shells of words, we 
attempt to stave off a sense_ of impending 
disaster. Whether we like the world that 
is to be or not, it is, somehow reassuring 
to know that "capitalism"will always be 
around, or that "development" will still 
be the major project of the human race. 
But are these reasonable assumptions? It 
seems to met that our job as intellectuals, 
as academics, is to extract new meanings 
from the events as they unfold, and to 
share our tentative insights with others. 
So let us look at the present transition to 
see what it holds in store for us, and then 
ask, what all this means for the tasks of 
development in the so-called Third 
World. 
I should like to put in a caveat at this 
point. First, Third World is a very loose 
and increasingly useless designation of 
poor countries which claim some inde­
pendence from the· two major power 
blocks in the world: the USA and the 
USSR. South Africa is not Third World, 
and the problems of black and coloured 
people in South Africa are not, in essence 
Third World problems. They are funda­
mentally political problems produced by 
the apartheid policies of your govern­
ment. Any similarities to problems in a 
genuine Third World country, such as 
Tanzania or India, are superficial. A 
squatment in Madras is not the same as 
a Soweto, or an informal settlement in 
K wa Zulu. Second, it is in any event 
misleading to divide up the world into 
first, second, and third; or into rich and 
poor; or into developed and developing. 
The actual realities, as we approach the 
turn of the century, are much more 
complex. However, lest c_omplexity 
reduce us to silence, let us at least accept 
that a world chart can be drawn up that 
arranges national societies on a conti­
nuum with respect to the time when indus­
trialization began to become more or 
less important for them. And just to be 
clear on that point let us agree to call 
industrialization that process by which 
the factory system is introduced, along 
with its institutional innovations, such 
as scientific management. So then we 
can speak of newly as well as of older 
industrializing countries, some of the 
latter already moving into what is 
sometimes called the post-industrial era. 
Now that we are clear on this, let us 
return to our subject. I have spoken of a 
"transition". What are its salient features? 
Surely, what I have to tell you will 
scarcely be a revelation. All the same, it 
is good to remind ourselves. Capitalism 
has broken through its national cocoon 
and has begun to organize the world as a 
single set of interdependent markets for 
finance, labour, production, and con­
sumption. It is a staggering and, at the 
same time, frightening achievement. New 
words, like global sourcing, are entering 
our vocabulary. The technologies of satel­
lite, computer, and high-speed, long­
distance transport have made it possible. 
Capital moves instantaneously, noise­
lessly from continent to continent, city 
to city, building, tearing down, altering 
the very conditions of life. Its main object 
in this frantic mobility is profits. Labour, 
follows suit more slowly, drifting to 
where the jobs are, to where the money 
is. National boundaries have become 
secondary. In any event, capital mobility, 
largely unchecked, can force a single 
global wage over a wide spectrum of 
occupations. Technology, for the most 
part qeveloped within the older indus­
trialized societies, becomes available any­
where in the world with only a short 
delay, as production becomes increa­
singly standardized. Multiple factories, 
virtually interchangeable, allow a cor­
poration to produce identical commodi­
ties in several locations, so that in the 
event of a strike in one plant, the slack in 
production can be taken up in another, 
thus defeating the strategy of labour, 
which cannot (at least until now) act in 
the same way, globally. Finally, people's 
tastes are becoming homogenized. What 
appears to middle-income consumers in 
Johannesburg as desirable consumption, 
perhaps soon as a "necessity", is the very 
same desire and necessity in Frankfurt, 
Tokyo and Sao Paulo. 
The new global order has its hero-actors, 
too: the trans-national corporation ( and 
its executive elites) along with the inter­
national banks that make the essential 
financing possible. What is remarkable 
here is the extraordinary concentration 
of production among firms. A mere 
handful of corporations, counting in the 
hundreds, is responsible for the bulk of 
manufacturing production and related 
services throughout the world. These vast 
conglomerates are no longer much inte­
rested in the products they make, nor in 
their usefulness and craftsmanship; they 
no longer have even a paternal interest 
in the men and women who work for 
them. They have a pure and unadulte­
rated interest in money. 
Well, so what, you might say. Such 
things as the world economy, and indus­
trial concentration are scarcely new 
phenomena. We have learned to live with 
them and prosper. I don't want to get 
involved in this argument which has to 
do with how we read past history, 
because the point I wish to make would 
be valid regardless of what the outcome 
of such a debate about the newness of 
the new trends might be. My point can 
be stated quite simply: in the new era 
into which we are moving, territorially 
based communities :- cities, regions, and 
nations - are to a considerable extent at
the mercy of trans-national capital. 
Soon, the national flag of a so-called 
trans-national corporation (for instance, 
the country in which it is incorporated) 
will have virtually no meaning, just as a 
· Liberian registry for a petroleum tanker
is meaningless for the well-being of the
Liberian people. Trans-national capital
(and the global network of institutions
supporting them) is virtually unaccount-
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able to territorial interests. It is neither 
patriotic, nor nationalistic, and it doesn't 
care what happens to this or that country 
unless it plays a major role in the inter­
national economy. 
A third aspect of the global transition is 
our heightened awareness of the limits
to growth. Driven by competition, capi� 
talism is engaged in an ever more frantic 
search for new markets, new technolo­
gies, new products, increases in product­
ivity, and higher profits. The ideologists 
of development have used metaphors 
such as the "take-off into sustained 
growth" as their stock-in-trade. But it 
has become clear that the world as a 
whole cannot indefinitely sustain rapid 
growth, and that certain limits are going 
to be imposed, no matter how clever we 
are at devising new technologies. Some 
non-renewable resources will sooner. or 
later give out or become, at any rate, 
prohibitively expensive; the air and the 
oceans of the world can accept only so 
much garbage before they become dange­
rous for human life; there is the famous 
greenhouse effect, as carbon dioxide 
builds up in the atmosphere. Economists 
tell us we don't need to worry, that rela­
tive pricing will take care of all the little 
problems that are likely to emerge. But 
they have never, to my knowledge, made 
their calculations based on a world count­
ing ten or fifteen billion people, all trying 
desperately to reach a Swiss standard of 
living! 
Whatever the future may hold in store 
for humanity, the fact is that, perhaps 
for the first time since the onset of the 
industrial revolution, we have begun to 
think in terms of limits. Clearly, this 
provides a different setting for countries, 
such as India and China, with their bil­
lions of people, and a per capita income 
that at present is only l / 10 to l / 20 of 
that in western Europe, and whose 
announced ambition is to attain living 
standards that are on par with those of 
the existing powerful nations. That sense 
of limits is likely to become more pro­
nounced as we move info the next cen­
tury, with its massive and projected short­
ages in energy, food and water. 
The fourth trend which marks the tran­
sitio,n is the disappearance of dichoto­
mous models of relationship in the inter­
national community - for example, of a 
. development that is either autonomous 
or dependent - to one that is increasingly 
interdependent. The interdependency is 
being forged by trans-national capital, 
and by the prospective resource short­
ages. So, strictly speaking, what has 
become interdependent is the global 
economic system which is best looked at 
as a totality and which is overlying a 
quilted pattern of national and regional 
economies that have only limited (and it 
would seem, dwindling) powers of their 
own to back up any claims to sove­
reignty. Since economy and territory are 
not so readily separated, however, except 
for analytical purposes, it is probably 
correct to speak of an interdependent, 
international system of states. That for­
mulation implies accepting a limitation 
on sovereign power: nations can no 
longer do exactly as they please, even or 
perhaps especially, those that are the 
most powerful among them. The�r 
options are becoming more restricted. 
They are also becoming increasingly 
subject to international blackmail or, to 
be more polite, or persuasive, interna­
tional pressure. The United States, for 
instance, has publicly announced its will­
ingness to use its superior food producing 
capacity as a political weapon in inter­
national dealings; and for a number of 
years, the OPEC countries held the West 
at ransom. As more and more shortages 
in strategic resources appear, even rela­
tively weak states will be able to back up 
their demands with appropriate action 
in the international arena. 
Finally, I sh<;>uld like to mention an 
important counter-trend to the growing 
globalization of the economy: the re­
discovery of territorial values and the 
doctrine of self-reliance by which terri­
torial entities, be they regions or nation 
states, attempt to protect their historical 
identity. It seems that some dialectical 
law is at work here which prevents any 
single force from totalizing itself. The 
traditional free trade doctrine is being 
challenged as countries as well as regions 
seek to "develop" what is uniquely their 
own and, at the same time, provide for 
the basic needs of their populations. 
Regional interest are asserting themselves 
politically, seeking some form of self­
governance. United Nations conferences 
in all seriousness discuss such topics as 
"development from below", self­
sufficiency in food production, peasant­
based development, social participation, 
self-management, industrial demo-
cracy ... It is a whole new agenda about 
which very little was said only ten short 
years ago. Some of these topics have 
come to be lumped together under the 
general headings of "another develop­
ment" and a "new international economic 
order" which look towards a differen­
tiated world compatible with the assump­
tions of global limits. 
I do not claim to have exhausted the 
categories by which the coming new 
world - post-capitalist and p_ost­
development - may be described. But we 
now have enough of a common voca­
bulary (I hope) to ask some searching 
questions about the future of poor and 
still largely agrarian economies in Africa, 
Latin America, the Middle East, and 
Asia. 
• what are the prospects ftir poor coun­
tries to "catch up"' with living levels in
the older, industrial countries? Can
we look forward to a gradual, world­
wide convergence in the standards of
consumption?
• even if we assume, under the most
favourable conditions, that the "catch­
ing up" process may take a very long
time, what likelihood is there of an
egalitarian development? Does the
urban transition hold out the promise
of universal prosperity?
• what are the prospects of a·peaceful,
democratic transition to a new world
order?
• what are the chances for the counter­
movement of"another development",
incorporating notions of basic needs,
extensive social participation, self­
reliance, appropriate technology, and
eco-development in a world increa­
singly under the sway of a small
number of gigantic global corpora­
tions?
I shot1ld like to say at the outset that I 
am no more a prophet than anyone else 
in this audience. I shall therefore- put up 
my answers as propositions to be chal­
lenged. I think it is important that we 
start to talk about these questions, and 
that we draw into the circle of discussion 
the very people on whose backs this his­
torical "experiment" will be carried out. 
It is only by gaining consciousness of the 
realities that we face, that we can forge a 
will capable of transcending these very 
realities and bring into existence the kind 
of world that we would want for our-
25 
selves and our children. 
l .  What, then, shall we say about the 
prospects of"catching up"? Some relative 
latecomers to the industrialization pro­
cess have obviously made it. There is 
Germany, for example, and then there is 
· Japan, and in the shadows of Japan,
South Korea. And there are the emerging
"global cities"' in different parts of the
world periphery (it would perhaps be
more accurate to say, the semi-periphery)
which are becoming the basing points of
trans-national capital and which are
evolving towards a common type:
Tokyo, Hong Kong and Singapore, with
secondary roles in Asia assigned to
Manila, perhaps Sydney and also Bom­
bay; in Latin Americaf Mexico City and
Sao Paulo, with perhaps Miami co-opted
into the southern hemisphere; no city yet
in either the Middle East or Africa,
unless you wish to include Johannesburg;
and, in the older industrial countries,
Paris, London and the Randstadt in
Europe; New York and Los Angeles in
the USA, together with a number of
secondary centres, such as Houston, San
Francisco, and Chicago. All of these
cities are surging ahead, their post­
industrial economies in the lead.
But once we leave these multi-million
urbanized regions, with all the problems
that are unique to them, and venture
into the true periphery, with their billions
of people languishing in rural back­
wardness, what are the prospects there?
They get the cast-off industries from the
West, they are increasingly unable to
feed their own people, they hear only a
faint echo of the world beyond their
boundaries. Their technology, like their
fuel and knowledge, is imported. The
pressure of population on the land is
relentless. A small elite lives in compara­
tive luxury. As for the rest, they are
lucky to survive. To speak of a "catching
up" under these circumstances is sheer
fantasy. And attempts to fashion policies
that will lead to the imitation of a
Sweden or an Austria, not to mention
the United States, are doomed to failure,
at least in our life time. This is the classi­
cal terrain, so to speak, of "another
development". I 'will return to this
question later.
2. But if "catching up" is not in the cards
for most peripheral economies, or at best
will take many generations, can we still
hold out a hope that, such developments
as do occur will take a more egalitarian 
form than in the past? Can we look to an 
evening out of incomes, to steady 
employment for everyone who wants to 
work, and to a decent minimum for the 
great masses of the people? 
Unfortunately, the answer, for large parts 
of the world, is in the negative. Inequities 
abound, they are likely to get more polar­
iz.ed and more severe, there are few counter­
vailing forces anywhere. Whether accu­
mulation is by big capital or by the state, 
the results are likely to be similar. World 
cities will have the worst inequities, as 
millions of the world's poor will stream 
into them to pull themselves up out of 
their poverty. These millions cannot be 
productively absorbed except in the low­
liest of service occupations. They will be 
herded into ghettos where they will live 
under conditions that, though in some 
respects better than in the backwater 
towns from which they came, neverthe­
less wil be in stark contrast to the glitter 
of the world-class elites and their 
immediate cohorts. A few will indeed 
manage to rescue themselves, but the 
majority will drop ever further behind. 
The same can be said about rural/ urban 
contrasts in general: some rural regions 
will of course do very well. They will 
practice large-scale commercial or cor­
porate agriculture using increasingly capital­
intensive techniques. Much of that pro­
duction will be for export, though some 
staple food production may also be 
undertaken to ensure a steady food 
supply to the urban population in the 
country concerned. In some parts of the 
world, huge cattle ranches will push 
smallscale peasant farmers from their 
traditional lands, leaving them with the 
option of either moving into more 
remote rural districts or drifting to the 
city in search of a livelihood. The urban 
bias in investment policy is not likely to 
be reversed in most parts of the world. It 
is the urban elites who call the important 
shots. What national leaders, after all, 
have peasants' interest truly at heart? 
This picture holds true for at least those 
regions of the world, and they are the 
vast majority, where rural populations 
are still increasing in absolute numbers, 
even though there is substantial migra­
tion to cities. Rural densities increase; 
the natural fallow cycle is aborted; product­
ivity falls. Where the so-called green 
revolution is introduced, and it can only 
be introduced where the possibility exists 
for large-scale irrigation, some peasant 
farmers - those who gain access to credit 
and who work their own land - will
prosper and will be able to give at least 
their sons a start in an urban career that 
leads them out of poverty. But many 
more farmers will only subsist, as before, 
perhaps now working for wages on their 
neighbours' lands. In any event, govern­
ments in the world periphery, and even 
more in the semi-periphery, will prefer 
to spend their resources for rural develop­
ment on the commercial, corporate, or 
state sectors. 
3. If we must count then on inequality,
can we at least look forward to a peace­
ful, democratic transition to a new world
order, under the aegis of trans-national
capital? The answer depends on the
assumptions we make. Poverty alone is
never reason enough for revolt, nor
does rebellion imply revolution. Still, and 
to the extent that poverty is polarized in 
cities, where demand-making is easier,
and where the masses are more suscep­
tible to political mobilization, tensions
are likely to increase.
This is especially true for those countries 
where supreme efforts at "catching up" 
will be made. Of recent memory, we 
have the examples of South Korea, 
Taiwan, Chile, and Brazil, where it took 
military regimes and the most severe 
political repression to maintain some­
thing like an internal peace. You could 
argue that the period of severe repression 
was limited, and that once prosperity 
was achieved, political control could be 
relaxed. But if I am correct, we will see 
very few relative successes of this sort in 
the next 30 to 50 years, and where equal­
ity is concerned, even Brazil cannot by 
any stretch of the imagination be called 
"successful". That country's present 
experiment with democracy may not last 
very long. 
I think we can invoke a general rule or 
principle which g9es something like this: 
coercion increas.es as. the legitimacy of 
the existing state declines. And under 
conditions of increasing social polari­
zation, the legitimacy of the state is likely 
to diminish. If the rule holds, we can 
look forward to a world in which military 
dictatorships are no longer the exception 
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but the rule, in which a growing portion 
of national resources will be channelled 
towards the military establishment, in 
which there will be fought many bitter 
little wars of liberation, and in which 
civil liberties will fall victim to torture, 
exile, and death. Most of Africa, Latin 
America, and South East Asia is already 
occupied by military dictatorships. The 
trend is not likely to be reversed. 
4. My view of the world is certainly a
not very inviting one, and the global­
ization of conflict between East and
West, rekindled (I am ashamed to say)
by a bomb-rattling American President
and his advisors, make it still gloomier.
In this terrible world, where we face the
daily prospect of annihilation by nuclear
warheads and our only hope, if we can
call it hope, is mutual deterrence by
terror, what chances exist for a counter­
movement embodying the principles of
"another development"? Isit not a hope­
lec;sly utopian project? Should we not
simply try to save our own skin, join the
oppressors, and terrorize the rest of the
world, for however long that may last?
The temptation is no doubt real for those 
who are in a position to help themselves 
in this way. The proponents of "another 
development" who talk of basic needs 
and self-reliance, of social participation 
and solidarity, and of meaningful human 
activity may be right in some theoretical 
sense. Their model has at least a theore­
tical chance of working, whereas the 
"catching up" model has no chance at 
all. But do they have the political clout 
to bring it about? What are the poli�ical 
pre-conditions for "another develop­
ment"? Surely, states do not act out of 
benevolence for their subjects, surely they 
have to be forced to act in the interest of 
the people as a whole instead of merely 
the elect. This will require political action 
of some sort. Mere advocacy of "another 
development" is not enough: it remains 
a utopia devised by a committee. 
But it is also true, at least for now, that 
the blueprint for an "alternative devel­
opment" is addressed mostly to those 
already pre-disposed to believe in it. 
And yet, I have some hope that it may 
strike fire, that the ideas for an "alter­
native development" will find a politics 
of transformation commensurate with its 
great hopes. It is the only real hope we 
can muster. It is not without some basis. 
It is a hope in people's determination to 
be free to construct their own lives and 
not be swallowed up by the megamachine 
of global management. It is hope in the 
interdependency of a world that creates 
global cities in the periphery and peri­
pheries in the heart of global cities. It is 
a hope in the existing counter-movement 
that is dedicated to bring about a major 
change in the core countries of the world 
economy which has been gathering 
strength sin<;e it first appeared in th early 
60s. The tactical objectives of this move­
ment have kept changing. Most recently, 
they have been concerned with nuclear 
disarmament, women's liberation, 
human rights, ecology, and regional self­
determination. These movements pre­
figure an "alternative development" 
whose immediate future in the core coun­
tries of capitalism is perhaps brighter 
than it is in the periphery for which it 
was initially thought to be the most 
appropriate. 
If I am right in this, the proponents of 
an "alternative development" will do well 
to link arms with the social counter­
movements of the industrial world, help­
ing to swell their ranks, to maintain their 
momentum, and not to lose heart. 
